Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation
ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, and DANIEL PARAVISINI
The abstract:
We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self-reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.
大学の事務で，会計係の人が異動するのは分かるんだけど，教務係とか庶務係とかは，あんまり異動を頻繁にやって欲しくないなぁ，と思うわけですよ。
