empty votingって問題だよね－，っていう人が多いんだけれど，昔から，ex postに見ればそうかもしれないけれど，ex anteに見れば，価格で調整されるから別にいいんじゃん？って感じてた。
で，そんな直感を，少なくともequityでなくてdebtの場合にきちんと裏付けてくれるペーパーが：
Bolton and OehmkeCredit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem
(RFS 2011)
Abstract
The empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex ante and ex post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex ante commitment benefits: By strengthening creditors' bargaining power, they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium, giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance.
確かに，ex postにrenegotiationしにくくすることによってex anteの価値を上げるっていうのは，security designの典型的なパターンだよねぇ。
ただ，equityの場合はこれは使えない（というか，security designで株主間対立を扱ったものはあまりない）ので，empty votingも直ちにex anteにいいといえるかどうかは，もうちょっと考えなければいけなさそうだ。
